

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA**

AMIR H. SANJARI,)	
Plaintiff)	
)	
v.)	Cause No. 3:07-cv-00423-TLS
)	
ALISON GRATZOL,)	
Defendant)	
)	
<u>In Rem</u>)	
)	CONSIDERATION BY U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE REQUESTED

**ADDENDUM AND SUPPLEMENTAL TO PLAINTIFF'S
"VERIFIED MOTION TO EXPEDITIOUSLY
RECONSIDER, ALTER AND AMEND JUDGMENT" OF 10.29.2007**

The undersigned Plaintiff, Amir H. Sanjari ("Sanjari"), *self-represented, in propria persona*, in the above-captioned action against Defendant Alison Gratzol ("Gratzol") is hereby, and pursuant to the Constitution for the United States ("the Constitution") relevant federal statutes, timely filing to the instant US District Court ("USDC") in Northern Indiana the following:

A- addendum and supplemental (heretoafter referred to as "rule 59 motion addendum", or "the addendum") to his "VERIFIED MOTION TO EXPEDITIOUSLY RECONSIDER, ALTER AND AMEND JUDGMENT" (heretoafter referred to as the "rule 59 motion") filed on 10.29.2007 pursuant to **F. R. Civ. P. 6(a)** and **59 (e)**. The addendum further proves that the *in rem* order challenged in the instant case is unconstitutional and *void ab initio*, and was issued without judicial authority.

In support, Sanjari states as follows:

1. On 09.10.2007 Sanjari filed the instant *in rem* action in the instant matter

seeking “declaratory and injunctive relief declaring the said *in rem* order (issued and dated August 27, 2001, by Elkhart Superior Court of Indiana), and all subsequent orders based upon it, *void ab initio*,” “and for all other relief deemed just and proper in the premises.”.

2. On 09.17.2007, Sanjari filed a request to vacate referral to Magistrate Judge.
3. On 10.10.2007, Sanjari had to resort to filing an “EMERGENCY VERIFIED MOTION TO EXPEDITE CONSIDERATION OF THE INSTANT CASE; AND REAFFIRMATION OF REQUEST TO VACATE REFERRAL TO DISTRICT MAGISTRATE”.
4. On 10.17.2007 the instant USDC's *sua sponte* judgment was entered in which Sanjari's Complaint was misrepresented and unlawfully dismissed by the instant USDC under false pretext.
5. On 10.29.2007, Sanjari filed his rule 59 motion for reconsideration of the said judgment, and expeditious consideration of said motion.
6. Due to the relevant information having become available recently, Sanjari is filing the instant addendum.

JUDGES¹ IN THE STATE CASE DID (DO) NOT ACT IN JUDICIAL
CAPACITY AND HAD (HAVE) NO JUDICIAL AUTHORITY OR
JURISDICTION, AND
THEIR ORDERS ARE *VOID AB INITIO*

7. In his previous filings (see above), Sanjari showed beyond any doubt that the said *in rem* order and all other orders issued by Indiana judges and special judges

¹ The use of “judge” or “special judge” to refer to individuals claiming to occupy such positions in Indiana state courts is not to imply in any way that such individuals are real lawful judges with lawful judicial authority or that they occupy such positions lawfully. Indeed, it is shown that their claim to being judges and have judicial authority is fraudulent and unlawful.

(including but not limited² to special judge Michael D. Cook of Marshall Circuit Court, Marshall County, who issued the said *in rem* order, and special judge Rex L. Reed of Kosciusko Circuit Court, Kosciusko County who perpetuated and issued further orders based upon the said *in rem* order) in the state case, are unlawful, unconstitutional, fraudulent and, therefore, *void ab initio*.

8. In Indiana, the legislature enacted and codified in Indiana Codes (“IC”) **IC-33-34-2 and IC-5-4-1-9**, some of the requirements for all judges to lawfully occupy the office of a judge. These include, amongst others, the requirements of oath of office (to uphold the US Constitution) and bond of office.

IC 33-34-2-11

Oath

Sec. 11. Before assuming the duties of a judge, a judge must take an oath to:

- (1) faithfully perform the duties of the judge's office; and*
- (2) support and defend to the best of the judge's ability the constitution and laws of Indiana and the United States.*

IC 33-34-2-12

Bond

Sec. 12. (a) A judge shall:

(1) furnish a bond in a sum required by the circuit court judge to provide for the:

- (A) faithful discharge of the duties of the office; and*
- (B) payment or delivery to the proper persons of whatever money or other property may come into the judge's hands when acting as judge; and*

(2) file the bond with the county recorder.

The bond must also extend to cover a person that is appointed to act as judge under IC 33-34-5-4.

Also

IC 5-4-1-9

Time limitation for bond; failure to comply

Sec. 9. An officer required to give an official bond shall give the bond before the commencement of his term of office. If the officer fails to give the bond before that time, the officer may not take

² Other judges in the state case include Terry Shewmaker and Magistrate David Denton, et al.

office.

(Formerly: Acts 1852, IRS, c.13, s.9.) As amended by Acts 1980, P.L.8, SEC.33; Acts 1980, P.L.24, SEC.3.

Also

IC 33-34-4-3 Sec. 3. A judge may:

“(3) do all acts necessary or proper in conformity with state laws; ”

And

CANON 1. ...they must comply with the law, including the provisions of this code...

violation of this code diminishes public confidence in the judiciary and thereby does injury to the system of government...

CANON 2. A. A judge **shall** respect and comply with the law...Actual improprieties under this standard include violations of law, court rules or other specific provisions of this code.

E. Under this rule, a judge is disqualified whenever the judge’s impartiality might reasonable be questioned.

CANON 3. A. (2) A JUDGE SHALL BE FAITHFUL TO THE LAW

N.B. The above Indiana Codes and Canons are, herein, utilized to show that the said judges were not acting as lawful judicial officers and did not have judicial powers lawfully, and that they have, through violating the above laws, additionally rendered the occupation of their positions unlawful, and their orders *void*. The said Codes and Canons are not meant to replace or supplant the superior and true Law of the Land, i.e. United States Constitution and its constitutionally devised laws under some of which the instant action has been brought.

9. Therefore, according to the above Indiana Codes,

A. a judge is required (there is no discretion) to have a bond of office,

B. that said bond is required to be filed with the office of relevant county recorder.

(In the case of special judge Rex L. Reed, this means Kosciusko

county recorder; of special judge Michael D. Cook, Marshall county recorder; and of judge Terry Shewmaker and Magistrate David Denton, Elkhart county recorder), and

- C. that said bond is required to be filed with the county recorder prior to commencement of judge's term of office, failing which implies that the candidate judge occupies the judge's position unlawfully.

Furthermore,

- D. a judge is required to “*support and defend to the best of the judge's ability the constitution and laws of Indiana and the United States*”.

Sanjari has already, in his prior papers (see above), shown that the judges and special judges in the instant state case violated the Constitution for the United states and Sanjari's and his children's fundamental rights under it.

10. Failing to satisfy any of the above requirements results in the candidate judge not being entitled to the judicial authority (and jurisdiction) vested in the office of the judge. If the candidate judge occupies the judge's position and acts as a judge without satisfying the above requirements, he would be doing so fraudulently and under pretense. (This is official misconduct and under the Indiana Constitution judges can be removed for any charge of misdemeanor- official misconduct is a felony class D).

Furthermore, perjury is a felony Class D, and a candidate judge pretending to be a judge and exercise the authority of a judge without satisfying the above

requirements is committing perjury and deception. As will be shown herein, the above named judges and special judges have committed perjury and deception and usurpation of judicial authority as they lied about being qualified as judges, and issued orders pretending to have judicial authority that they clearly did not have.)

11. Furthermore, said judges are in violation of their oaths of office by violating the Constitution for the United States through violating the undersigned's and his children's fundamental rights including but not limited to due process rights in issuing the said *in rem* order.

12. If candidate judges, such as the said judges and special judges herein, do not satisfy the above requirements, they are not judges and act without judicial authority and in usurpation of authority of judicial office. Hence committing fraud upon the court and those before them. Furthermore, they do not have and never had subject matter or personal jurisdiction in the state case, and their orders are unlawful and void ab initio.

13. Special Judge Michael D. Cook (of Marshall Circuit court), who issued the instant *in rem* order subject of the instant USDC action, was not qualified as a judge, had no jurisdiction and his orders including, but not limited to, the instant *in rem* order were/are *void ab initio*. **Exhibit # 1**, (communication from the Marshall county recorder's office) confirms that judge Cook had no bond of office in violation of the requirement of the above Indiana Codes. As the Indiana law requires the bonds be filed with the county recorders, the said recorder's response regarding the bond being kept at the "Division of Secretary of State's office" can be but a ruse

to send the undersigned on the proverbial “wild goose chase”. **Exhibit # 2**, (communication from the Indiana Secretary of State's office) the Secretary of State confirms that their “*agency [indeed] does not maintain bonds for elected officials including county court judges. It is [their] understanding that generally bonds of county level elected office holders are filed with and maintained by the county recorder in the respective county.*” The prime point herein being that the bond is not filed with county recorder's office where the candidate judge is supposed to have filed it, if he/she had a bond. Hence, violating the legal requirement of a bond to lawfully occupy a judgeship.

14. Similarly, the other special judge Rex L. Reed (of Kosciusko Circuit Court) issuing orders in the state case, has been unlawfully occupying the position as a “judge” as he too has failed to satisfy the (above) requirements of the office. See **Exhibit # 3** (communication from the Kosciusko county recorder's office) to be considered in conjunction with **Exhibit # 2** above, confirming the absence of any bond of office by Rex L. Reed.

15. Ditto for judges and magistrates of Elkhart county courts who do not have bonds of office in violation of legal requirements for judgeship in Indiana. See §3, **Exhibit # 4** (communication from Elkhart county recorder's office), in conjunction with **Exhibit # 2**.

16. Herein, Sanjari has shown that the judges ruling and issuing orders (including but not limited to the instant *in rem* order) in the state case were never and are not lawfully vested with proper judicial power as they never satisfied the

requirements of their office as enacted and mandated by Indiana legislature.

17. Sanjari has shown that the judges ruling and issuing orders (including but not limited to the instant *in rem* order) in the state case have committed fraud and pretended to be and lied about being a judge, and that they have usurped the position and authority of a judge as they have not satisfied the legal requirements of occupying that position, i.e., they have not filed bond of office with the proper authorities and they have violated their oath of office to uphold and support the Constitution for the United States. Fraud by a judge by falsifying or concealing a material fact, making a false representation, writing a false document, or having knowledge that a document is false (**18 U.S.C. Sec. 1001**).

“Fraud upon the court” has been defined by the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals to *“embrace that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery can not perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication.”* **Kupferman v Consolidated Research & Mfg. Corp.** 459 F. 2d 1072, 1078; 2nd Cir. (1972); quoting **7 Moore’s Federal Practice**, 2d ed., pg. 515, ¶ 60.33.

Fraud encompasses a broad range of human behavior, including...anything calculated to deceive,...whether it be by direct falsehood or by innuendo, by speech or by Silence, by word of mouth or by look or gesture.” (**Reyenold v. Baby Ford, Inc.**, (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 419, 435, citing **People ex. Rel. Chicago Bar Ass. v. Gilmore**, (1931) 345 Ill.28, 46, **In re Alschuler**, (1944), 388 Ill 492, 503-04;

Black's Law Dictionary 594 (5th ed. 1979).

The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "*No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it.*". **Cooper v. Aaron**, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1401 (1958).

18. Sanjari has shown that the judges ruling and issuing orders (including but not limited to the instant *in rem* order) in the state case have, without jurisdiction, presided over the state case without being a proper and qualified judge and without judicial authority. Therefore, their orders (including but not limited to the instant *in rem* order) are (not voidable, but simply) *void ab initio*, as they never had the authority nor were qualified to hold the judicial office enabling them to issue the said orders.

19. This principle of law was stated by the U.S. Supreme Court as "***Courts are constituted by authority and they cannot go beyond that power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void, and this is even prior to reversal.***" [Emphasis added]. **Valley v. Northern Fire and Marine Ins. Co.**, 254 U.S. 348, 41 S. Ct. 116 (1920). See also **Old Wayne Mut. I. Assoc. v. McDonough**, 204 U.S. 8, 27 S.Ct. 236 (1907); **Williamson v. Berry**, 8 How. 495, 540, 12 L. Ed. 1170, 1189, (1850); **Rose v. Himely**, 4 Cranch 241, 269, 2 L.Ed. 608, 617 (1808).

The instant state court judges and special judges went "*beyond that power*" that they lawfully possessed because they were not holding their offices lawfully. Hence, the

instant *in rem* order and other related orders are *void ab initio*.

Pursuant to the **Valley** court decision, a *void* order does not have to be reversed by any court to be a *void* order. Courts have also held that, since a *void* order is not a final order, but is in effect no order at all, it cannot even be appealed. Courts have held that a *void* decision is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final. Consistent with this holding, in 1991, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that, “*Since such jurisdictional defect deprives not only the initial court but also the appellate court of its power over the case or controversy, to permit the appellate court to ignore it. ... [Would be an] unlawful action by the appellate court itself.*” **Freitag v. Commissioner**, 501 U.S. 868 (1991); **Miller, supra**. Following the same principle, it would be an unlawful action for a court to rely on an order issued fraudulently or by a judge who did not have subject-matter jurisdiction and therefore the order he issued was *void ab initio*.

United States v. Throckmorton. 98 US 61, 25 L Ed 93 (1878)

(The matter of jurisdiction involves two elements: First, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; and, second, jurisdiction over the subject-matter or the right to try the particular case presented to the court. Here by their general appearance the defendants have submitted their persons to the jurisdiction of the court, **but the court has no power to try the case presented; it being defective for want of proper authority of the officer undertaking to commence it.** In other words, the condition and situation disclosed by the complaint are not those in which the power of the court may be called into action. The rights of a citizen may not be called in question except in the manner provided by law. Many cases might be cited illustrative of the principle that it must appear in some way in the initial pleading that a case of the kind in question has been commenced by the authority of the proper officer, but these two will suffice.).

Indiana judges and special judges in the instance state case had “no power to try the case presented” before them because they were not lawfully vested in and appointed to their offices (above requirements by Indiana legislature). Hence, they did not have the pre-requisite judicial authority, and therefore no jurisdiction and their orders are void ab initio.

“There is no discretion to ignore that lack of jurisdiction.” Joyce v. US, 474 F2d 215.

20. If a judge does not fully comply with the Constitution, then his orders are void, **In re Sawyer**, 124 U.S. 200 (1888), he is without jurisdiction, and he has engaged in an act or acts of treason. When judges act when they do not have jurisdiction to act, or they enforce a void order (an order issued by a judge without jurisdiction), they become trespassers of the law, and are engaged in treason.

The United States Supreme Court has clearly, and repeatedly, held that any judge who acts without jurisdiction is engaged in an act of treason. **U.S. v. Will**, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101, S. Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed. 2d 392, 406 (1980). **Cohens v. Virginia**, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821). **Twining v. New Jersey**, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S.Ct. 14, 24, (1908), *stated that “Due Process requires that the court which assumes to determine the rights of parties shall have jurisdiction.”*; citing **Old Wayne Mut. Life Assoc. v. McDonough**, 204 U. S. 8, 27 S. Ct. 236 (1907); **Scott v. McNeal**, 154 U.S. 34, 14, S. Ct. 1108 (1894); **Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago**, 166 U.S. 226, 41 L. ed. 979, 17 Sup Ct. Rep. 581.

21. *"Where there is absence of proof of jurisdiction, all administrative and judicial proceedings are a nullity, and confer no right, offer no protection, and afford no justification, and may be rejected upon direct collateral attack."*

Thompson v. Tolmie, 2 Pet. 157, 7 L. Ed. 381; and **Griffith v. Frazier**, 8 Cr. 9, 3 L. Ed. 471.

Indiana state judges did not / do not have jurisdiction to issue the *in rem* and related orders due to their "judicial" appointments being unlawful and fraudulent, i.e. they were never lawfully vested with pre-requisite judicial authority of the position they purport to occupy as judges.

22. In the case of **Bradley v. Fisher**, 80 U.S. (13Wall.) 335, 351, 20 L. Ed. 646 (1871), the Supreme Court gave the example that, *"if a probate judge, with jurisdiction over only wills and estates, should try a criminal case, he would be acting in the clear absence of jurisdiction and would not be immune from liability for his actions."*

Similarly, the above mentioned judges in the instant state case not being lawfully vested with the pre-requisite judicial authority (no bond, violation of oath of office, therefore, not being a judge lawfully) did not and do not have jurisdiction in the instant state case.

An order that exceeds the jurisdiction of the court, is *void* and can be attacked *in any proceeding, in any court, where the validity of the judgment comes into issue.*

See **Rose v. Himely** (1808), 4 Cranch 241, 2 L. Ed. 608; **Pennoyer v. Neff** (1877) 95 U.S. 714, 24 L. Ed 565; **Thompson v. Whitman**, (1873) 18 Wall 457, 21 L. Ed

897; **Windsor v. McVeigh**, (1876) 93 U.S. 274, 23 L. Ed 914; **McDonald v. Mabee**, (1917) 243 U.S. 90, 37 S. Ct. 343, 61 L. Ed 608.

"Where there is clearly no jurisdiction over the subject matter, any authority exercised is usurped authority, and for the exercise of such authority, when the want of jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is permissible." **Bradley v. Fisher**; 13 Wall 335, 352.

23. *"Fraud Vitiates the most solemn contracts, documents, and even judgments."* **United States v Throckmorton**, 98 U.S. 61, 70 (1878).

"A universal principle as old as the law is that a proceedings of a court without jurisdiction are a nullity and its judgment therein without effect either on person or property." **Norwood v. Renfield**, 34 C 329; **Ex parte Giambonini**, 49 P. 732.

"Jurisdiction is fundamental and a judgment rendered by a court that does not have jurisdiction to hear is void ab initio." **In Re Application of Wyatt**, 300 P. 132; **Re Cavitt**, 118 P2d 846.

"Thus, where a judicial tribunal has no jurisdiction of the subject matter on which it assumes to act, its proceedings are absolutely void in the fullest sense of the term."

Dillon v. Dillon, 187 P27.

"Judgment of court lacking jurisdiction is void" **Burnham v. Superior Court of California, County of Marin**, 110 S.Ct. 2105 (1990).

24. A void judgment, *"that is, one entered by a court which lacks jurisdiction over the parties, the subject matter, or lacks inherent power to enter the particular judgment, or an order procured by fraud, can be attacked at any time, in any court, .*

either directly or collaterally, provided that the party is properly before the court.”

"Void judgments may be defined as one in which rendering court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, lacked personal jurisdiction or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law." **Eckel v. MacNeal**, 628 N.E.2d 741 (Ill. App. Dist. 1993).

In the instant matter, the *in rem* order, and all other related orders in the state case, were issued while lacking "inherent power to enter the particular order" as well as lacking jurisdiction, in addition to the said orders having been procured and issued through fraud. Hence, the said orders are *void ab initio*.

25. "A judgment of a court without hearing the party or giving him an opportunity to be heard is not a judicial determination of his rights, and is not entitled to respect in any other tribunal." **Sabariego v. Maverick**, 124 U.S. 261, 31 L. Ed 430, 8 S. Ct. 461. The instant *in rem* order was sought and issued thus.

Therefore, it is *void*.

"A void judgment does not create any binding obligation." Federal decisions addressing void state court judgments include; **Kalb v. Feuerstein**, (1940) 308 U.S. 433, 84 L. Ed. 370; **Ex Parte Rowland**, (1882) 104 U.S. 604, 26 L. Ed 861.

26. "A 'void judgment', as we all know, grounds no rights, forms no defense to actions taken thereunder, and is vulnerable to any manner of collateral attacks (thus here by habeas corpus). No Statute of limitations or repose runs on its holdings, the matters thought to be settled thereby are not *res judicata*, and years latter, when the memories may have grown dim, any disgruntled litigant may reopen the old wound and once more probe its depths. And it is then as though trial

and adjudication had never been.” Fritts v. Krugh, 92 N.W. 2d 604, 626

(Michigan).

27. The instant USDC is urged to expeditiously rule upon the Plaintiff's motion to reconsider (rule 59 motion) of 10.29.2007 and the instant addendum herein to it. The Plaintiff has already partially outlined in his earlier papers (e.g. the Complaint of 09.10.2007, Emergency motion to expedite of 10.10.2007, etc) the unlawfulness and violations that result and have resulted from the USDC's delay in issuing its rulings in this matter, as well as the sanctions (at appellate level, other federal court level, congressional level, etc) that are provided for such violations that, in turn, give, in conjunction with the nature of its judgment of 10.17.2007 (above), the appearance of collusion with, and obstruction of justice to protect, Indiana state judiciary, and in violation of the Plaintiff's due process rights and access to the courts, etc.

28. Sanjari is aware and has proof of the unconstitutional programs provided to various state and federal judges by and through the State Justice Institute, a federally funded organisation, training said judges to unlawfully deny and deprive litigants, especially the self-represented, who challenge the constitutionality of other judges' orders especially when such challenge may result in exposing corruption within the judiciary. It maybe noted that such activities have already been reported to various federal and congressional authorities along with relevant evidence before the United States Congress seeking investigation into such activities as pertain to state and federal judiciaries as well as the conduct of certain federal judges' due process

violations, obstruction of justice, collusion, conspiracy and other acts in order to protect other miscreant judges.

29. The issues in the instant action are simple enough that no dismissal of it can be explained by judicial error or discretion. Denial of this action can only result from either judicial disability or other constitutional violations by the court.

30. Given that minor children have been and are being abused in unlawful “custody” as a result of the instant *in rem* orders, the instant court will share responsibility for further damage to the said children as a result of deliberate and unlawful delays in ruling in Band/or dismissal of this action, not to mention issuing decisions with misrepresentation and in violation of the Constitution and federal laws, and in a clear attempt to deprive the Plaintiff of his and his children's Constitutional rights.

CONCLUSION

30. In conclusion, Sanjari has herein, and in addition to his earlier papers, shown that:

i. the state judges/ special judges did not have lawful judicial authority (and hence jurisdiction) to rule in the state case as they had not satisfied the pre-requisite requirements for acting and were not qualified to act as judges with lawful judicial authority. And that they unlawfully usurped the power and authority of a judge and further committed fraud pretending to be judges. Therefore, their orders are *void ab initio*.

ii. In his earlier papers in this action, Sanjari showed beyond doubt that,

notwithstanding (i) above, the *in rem* and other orders issued by the Indiana courts in the instant state case, were fraudulently procured and issued in violation of Sanjari's procedural due process and other constitutional rights. Hence, on the face of them, rendering such orders *void ab initio*.

WHEREFOR Plaintiff Sanjari, *self-represented*, respectfully requests that the instant USDC expeditiously:

A- review Sanjari's motion to reconsider of 10.29.2007 in conjunction with the instant addendum herein and reconsider and reverse its judgment of 10.17.2007, regarding the Plaintiff's Complaint of 09.10.2007 and other motions, and similarly expeditiously proceed to issuing the requested injunctive relief adjudging and declaring the instant *in rem* order null and *void*.

Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "A. H. Sanjari" followed by a stylized flourish, enclosed within a hand-drawn oval.

Dated: December 26, 2007

Amir H. Sanjari
self-represented, in propria persona

c/o 130 D Old Ferry Road
Haverhill, MA 01830
Ph: (978) 702 4765

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that an additional copy of the above and foregoing document is mailed to the US District Court (USDC), Northern Indiana on this 26th day of December, 2007, to be served by the United States Marshall Service (see Plaintiff's Civil Summons and IFP Applications to the said USDC and in view of the fact that the Complaint has not been served to the Defendant yet) upon the following:

Alison Gratzol (Defendant)
Radiation Oncology Unit
Elkhart General Hospital
600 East Boulevard
Elkhart, Indiana 46514.

A handwritten signature in black ink, enclosed in a hand-drawn oval. The signature appears to read "A. H. Sanjari" followed by a stylized flourish.

Amir H. Sanjari
self-represented, in propria persona

c/o 130 D Old Ferry Road
Haverhill, MA 01830
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